I. INTRODUCTION
There is an important class of public goods for which preferences leave no observable 'trace' in individual behaviour. Such goods include, for example, the preservation of wilderness areas from which individuals may benefit merely by knowing of their existence. The values of such goods have been termed 'passive-use', 'existence ', or 'non-use' values (Krutilla 1967) . The increasing importance of these values for public decision making and the difficulty of their measurement gained much attention in the process of damage assessment following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. According to the current textbook wisdom, the only economic valuation methods that are potentially able to estimate these values are stated preferences techniques, such as the contingent valuation (CV) method. These methods use surveys in which respondents are asked about their willingness to pay for a proposed project concerned with a change in the provision of a public good, or about their decision in a hypothetical referendum or other choice situation (e.g., Pommerehne 1987 , Mitchell and Carson 1989 , Kopp et al. 1997 .
While stated preferences for many public goods can be compared with values derived from observed choices, there is little opportunity to externally test the validity of stated preferences for public goods with passive-use values. This is a significant problem since for a variety of reasons surveys of hypothetical choices may not always provide respondents with the necessary incentives to think hard and answer truthfully. Researchers have thus examined potential bias of hypothetical values in situations involving private commodities where a direct comparison of stated and actual choices is feasible (Bishop and Heberlein 1979 , Cummings et al. 1997 , Frykblom 1997 , or involving public goods with use value where stated values can be compared with those inferred using revealed preference techniques (Carson et al. 1996) . But it remains unclear whether the magnitudes of hypothetical bias found in these studies can be transferred to choices involving the passive-use values in which policymakers are often interested 1 .
However, there does appear to be a way to evaluate any hypothetical bias in stated passive-use values. As Arrow et al. (1993) and Shapiro and Deacon (1996) have suggested, the problem may be approached by comparing hypothetical values for public goods with willingness to pay implied by closely similar real-world voting decisions. This would involve conducting a stated preference survey before an actual referendum is implemented. In this way, stated individual choices could be compared with actual choices. Two practical approaches have been proposed so far. First, an apparently simple way to compare stated and actual voting behaviour is to compare stated preferences in a CV survey with voting choices of a sufficiently large sample of individual voters (Schläpfer et al. 2004) . Unfortunately, however, the procedures involved in surveying individual voting behaviour are potentially subject to some of the same criticisms as the CV survey itself: results may be biased due to sampling errors or interviewer effects. Second, constituency-level voting results and information on aggregate (mean) tax burden, age, education, income and other characteristics of individuals in voting districts can be used to construct a model of individual voting behaviour that is theoretically consistent with models of WTP derived from stated preferences (Vossler and Kerkvliet 2003) . An important limitation of this latter approach is that the model can only be estimated if the effect of the tax share on voting choices can be estimated separately from the income effect. If income and tax shares are collinear in regression models, as in the case of public goods financed through income taxation, then effects cannot be singled out, and willingness to pay for the good cannot be inferred from the aggregate voting returns and tax liabilities.
In this note we propose an approach to compare stated preferences with those derived from aggregate voting data for public goods that can be applied in the case of collinearity of incomes and tax shares. The method imposes a strict condition on the distribution of willingness to pay and tax payments: however, this can be easily checked for in empirical applications.
II. THE 'INDIFFERENT VOTER' FRAMEWORK
Suppose a community plans to hold a referendum regarding the level of provision of a public good, G. The ballot alternatives will ask voters to cast ballots between two alternative levels of provision, G 0 and G 1 , where G 0 is the status quo. Prior to the election, a sample of voters is asked to state their willingness to pay for the proposed increase in the good, using accepted CV methodology. The plan is then to compare these stated valuations with the valuations implied by voting choices. While we do not observe the actual ballots of individual voters, we do observe aggregate election outcomes at, say, the constituency level.
Individuals voting in the referendum cast their ballots depending on whether the (unobserved) difference between willingness to pay (WTP) and the discrete tax increase (∆T), (that is, their net willingness to pay) is positive or negative: Assume now that, up to a random factor of taste, net willingness to pay is monotone increasing in income (I) 2, 3 :
Then, percentiles on the income (and net willingness to pay) distribution of the CV sample are identified with respective percentiles on the income (and willingness to pay) distribution in the voter population 4 . The willingness to pay distribution of the voter population is not known. However, assume that p percent of the voter population reject the proposition. Then, the p th percentile individual 2. It is not difficult to give sufficient conditions for the willingness to pay for the discrete change to be monotonically related to income. One example is for preferences that give marginal willingness to pay = g (I ) -β G, where I is income, G is the public good level, β is a positive constant, common to all voters, and g (⋅) is a monotone increasing function common to all voters. Then marginal WTP curves are all parallel and the intercepts depend only on individual income. In addition, assume the individual's tax share for the cost of the discrete change is τ (I ), a function of income alone. In this case the net WTP for the discrete change is monotone increasing in I if g′ -τ ′ is positive. 3. The required monotonicity assumption is closely analogous to that implicit in the median voter model (Barlow 1970 , Borcherding and Deacon 1972 , Bergstrom and Goodman 1973 . Median demand has been found to correspond well with the demand of the individual with median income (Inman 1978) . This result suggests that, more generally, the demand for public goods is monotone in income. However, if the demand is monotone in income, then net WTP for a (marginal) increase of the public good level should plausibly be monotone in income, as well. But this is exactly what our framework requires. The monotonicity assumptions should be realized at least for environmental public goods such as parks and recreation, where empirical income elasticities have generally been found to be well above 1. For instance, an income elasticity of the demand for parks and recreation of 2.74 is reported in Borcherding and Deacon (1972) . 4. If net WTP is monotone in income, then WTP is also monotone in income in all tax systems with dT / dI > 0.
is roughly indifferent between accepting or rejecting the proposition. His or her tax increase ∆T p should therefore equal his or her actual willingness to pay. The validity check for CV responses is accomplished by comparing this 'indifferent voter's' (implied) revealed willingness to pay, ∆T p , to the same percentile in the stated willingness to pay distribution, sWTP p . The appropriate 'calibration factor' by which stated WTP must be multiplied to arrive at voter WTP is then
Computation of the price ∆T p depends on the tax system. If the tax is on income, ∆T p can be derived from the income tax distribution and the costs of the proposition as a fraction of the total budget. If the tax is on utility charges, ∆T p must be estimated from the utility bill of the p th income individual.
For an illustrative numerical example, suppose a community of 1000 citizen-voters holds a referendum about a proposed purchase of land from private land owners in order to protect a habitat of endangered species. For simplicity, assume uniform taxation. The land costs are $ 0.5 million, so each citizenvoter's tax obligation is $ 500. A CV survey yields an aggregate WTP of $ 1 million. Suppose the actual proposition is accepted by 56 percent of the voters. Suppose further, that the results of a post-ballot voter poll suggest that the monotonicity condition holds. Then, the 44 th percentile individual on the net WTP distribution is indifferent about accepting or rejecting the proposition. Thus, he or she has a WTP for the land purchase that equals his or her expected tax increase. This value can now be compared with the stated WTP of the p th percentile in the stated WTP distribution of a CV survey conducted before the actual referendum. Suppose the 44 th percentile WTP is $ 750. The calibration factor would then be $ 500 / $ 750 = 0.667. Calibration of the aggregated WTP of $ 1 million would yield an aggregate actual WTP of $ 0.667 million.
III. DATA REQUIREMENTS
Procedures to gather the required data sets seem straightforward. There appear to be three important points to consider in setting up pairs of hypothetical and actual referenda.
(1) Only referenda that involve alternative levels of public good expenditures and varying tax burdens may be useful for comparison. In some referenda on public good issues, a substantial portion of the costs may arise not in the form of a change in the tax burden but as, for example, lost production and em-∆T P sWTP p ployment opportunities with costs to the individual about which one can only speculate. When on the other hand voting on public budget issues is chosen for comparison, individual voting choice can be cast in the same utility maximization framework as the CV responses. An individual i, given a known tax structure and disposable income, casts a vote depending on whether she is better off with or without the proposed change, considering both the change in the public good and the expected change in her taxes 5 .
(2) If the objective is to study the validity of hypothetical voting behaviour obtained in a typical CV survey context then the researcher cannot simply ask identical hypothetical (CV) questions at the same time as a real referendum is held 6 . Although a simple 'pre-election poll' may be similar to a CV survey in terms of some types of sampling error and potential 'social desirability bias', it differs crucially in terms of the information and motivational context and the incentives for strategic misrepresentation. The most relevant comparison would seem to be to carry out an independent CV study on an appropriate issue before the actual referendum proposition becomes the subject of public debate. One could also consider the possibility to conduct the survey in a separate but very similar population and locale to circumvent the problem of anticipating the referendum and completing the CV survey before people actually vote.
(3) The monotonicity assumption above implies certain restrictions on the relationship between WTP and tax shares for the population and proposition studied. In empirical applications the monotonicity assumption should be tested based on a post-ballot voter poll in which citizens are asked about their voting choices and incomes.
Referenda on the provision of regional or national public goods are often held at levels of government encompassing many voting districts. If sufficiently large samples of CV responses are available for each of several voting districts the comparison of hypothetical and actual WTP can be made for each individual district, providing several data points on CV bias for each ballot. Theoretically, variations in income levels (and WTP) across voting districts could then be used to examine whether or not calibration factors differ among different income groups. This would echo variations in calibration factors found by others for private goods (Fox et al. 1998 ).
5. As one referee pointed out, if the good is not financed directly by a tax increase, the opportunity costs of the good may be the value of a forgone alternative service. This is relevant in cases where a government's revenues are constrained below or above what optimal (or political equilibrium) provision would require. In such circumstances public revenue would command a scarcity premium or shadow price, and use of our method would require applying that shadow price to the dollar cost faced by the indifferent voter. 6. This approach was followed by Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003) .
IV. CONCLUSION
In spite of a rapidly growing literature, little progress has been made in debates over the degree of hypothetical bias in stated preference methods. This is mainly due to a lack of hard external validity tests. The voting-based validation method presented in this note is a powerful tool to help resolve this debate. Compared with previous studies, the results of these tests will be far more informative about what can be gained from stated preference methods applied to public goods and particularly public goods with significant passive-use values. Potential methodological insights concern the validity of results across various survey techniques and qualities. Looking at a set of studies across a range of policy questions, it may turn out that the implied CV biases are both large and unpredictable. In that case, the appropriate conclusion might be to discontinue using CV to decide policy questions. Alternatively, it might turn out that the implied calibration factors from studies of a variety of policy questions all fall within a reasonably narrow range. If so, one could use these results to compute upper and lower bounds on CV results for a similarly wide range of policy questions. In many cases, upper and lower bound information would be very useful for policy purposes. Where existing institutions do not allow individuals to articulate their preferences directly in a political process, survey-based values could then provide acceptable preference information.
